WILL WEERET WILL LAS

Classification

SECTO 4, FEBRUARY 5, 2 AM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

Control:

2567

EUR

Rec'd:

FEBRUARY 4, 1959

11:54 PM

Info

42-M Action

> FROM: LONDON

RMR

030

SS

TO:

NO:

Secretary of State

W

G

SP PRIORITY

C INR

H

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 4 REPEATED INFORMATION MOSCOW 150, BONN 246, PARIS 621. BERLIN 79.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

DURING MEETING LATE THIS AFTERNOON AT FONOFF SECRETARY AND SELWYN LLOYD DISCUSSED PRINCIPALLY BERLIN AND RELATED PROBLEMS. LLOYD SAID IT SEEMED WESTERN POWERS WERE IN STATE OF DISARRAY IN DEVELOPMENT THEIR POSITIONS. HOWEVER VAN SCHERPENBERG ON THURSDAY HAD GIVEN BRITISH IMPRESSION THAT FEDERAL REPUBLIC PREPARED TO SHOW SOME FLEXIBILITY ON SUCH ISSUES AS FRONTIERS AND AREAS OF LIMITED ARMAMENT. LLOYD NOTED THAT HE OPPOSED AGREEMENT ON LATTER POINT IF IT INVOLVED DISCRIMINATION AGAINST FOREIGN TROOPS, BUT THOUGHT THAT CONCEPT AREA OF CONTROLLED LIMITATION HAD MERIT.

FONSEC OUTLINED BRITISH VIEW THAT MEETING WITH SOVIETS SHOULD TAKE PLACE LATE APRIL OR EARLY MAY, THAT NOTE TO SOVIETS SHOULD SUGGEST SPECIFIC TIME AND PLACE, AND THAT FURTHER MEETING 4 FOREIGN MINISTERS (PRESUMABLY AT TIME NATO MEETING) WOULD BE NECESSARY BEFORE WESTERN SUBSTANTIVE POSITION FORMULATED.

SECRETARY SAID PROBLEM SEEMED TO FALL INTO TWO PARTS: (A) BERLIN AND WHAT WESTERN POWERS SHOULD DO IF SOVIETS PROCEEDED TO HAND CONTROL OF ACCESS OVER TO GDR; (B) WHAT WESTERN POWERS DID ABOUT POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS WITH

SOVIETS

R CFAR CASECRETA CO. TOTAL COM

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED. UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS Agency Case State 980278/



-2- SECTO 4, FEBRUARY 5, 2 AM (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM LONDON

SOVIETS AND HOW AND WHEN THEY SHOULD TRY TO BRING THESE ABOUT. RE DATE OF MEETING HE INDICATED IT DESIRABLE TO START BEFORE MAY 27. FRENCH, HOWEVER, DID NOT SHARE THIS VIEW. IN CONVERSATION YESTERDAY SECRETARY WITH AMBASSADOR ALPHAND, LATTER REITERATED POINT THAT ASKING FOR MEETING BEFORE MAY 27 WOULD BE SIGN OF WEAKNESS. SECRETARY SAID HE HAD AGREED TO ACCEPT EITHER NAMING OF DATE IN NOTE TO SOVIETS, OR MERELY SAYING THAT DATE AND PLACE SHOULD BE MUTUALLY AGREED, LEAVING SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS TO .

AMBASSADORS. ADVANTAGE OF MEETING WITH SOVIETS BEFORE MAY 27, SECRETARY CONTINUED, WAS THAT IT MIGHT PROVIDE SOVIETS WITH WAY OUT OF THEIR EXTREME BERLIN POSITION IF THEY WANTED TO FIND IT. IF MEETING WERE HELD WESTERN POWERS WOULD FACE MANY PROBLEMS, BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL.

RE SUBSTANCE, SECRETARY SAID HE THOUGHT WESTERN POSITION MIGHT BE BASICALLY SAME AS THAT OF NOVEMBER 1955, THOUGH IT COULD BE EMBELLISHED TO SOME EXTENT. ACTUALLY WESTERN POWERS HAD NEVER BEEN ABLE TO GET ACROSS MERITS THEIR POSITION. MOLOTOV HAD CLEVERLY PUT THEM ON DEFENSIVE BY MISREPRESENTING PROPOSALS AT OUTSET. US WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER THINNING OUT OF FORCES, GIVING CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT TO MILITARY VIEWS AS TO DESIRABILITY, BUT AGREED THERE SHOULD BE NO DISCRIMINATION EITHER AS TO FOREIGN TROOPS OR AS TO COUNTRY COVERED. OUR THESIS IS THAT NO NATION TODAY IS STRONG ENOUGH TO PROTECT ITS OWN SECURITY: COUNTRIES MUST HELP EACH OTHER. IF WE ADMIT THAT FOREIGN TROOPS IN GERMANY ARE PER SE EVIL, THEN THE WHOLE CONCEPT WOULD BE UNDERMINED. THINNING OUT COULD THEREFORE BE CONSIDERED, BUT NOT ELIMINATION OF FOREIGN FORCES. IN GENERAL IF DISCRIMINATORY PROVISIONS WERE APPLIED TO GERMANY IN ANY SETTLEMENT, WE WOULD AGAIN REAP CONSEQUENCES SIMILAR TO THOSE OF VERSAILLES. SOME FORMULATION WHICH STILL KEPT PORTION OF OUR FORCES IN GERMANY AND WHICH WAS BROADER THAN GERMANY IN APPLICATION PREFERABLY BROADER THAN POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA AS WELL MIGHT BE CONSIDERED.

UNCEASSIFILE

AFTER LLOYD



-3- SECTO 4, FEBRUARY 5, 2 AM (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM LONDON

AFTER LLOYD HAD STATED THAT ONE OF BASIC QUESTIONS WAS WHETHER GERMANS REALLY WANTED REUNIFICATION OR NOT, SECRETARY REFERRED TO LETTER HE HAD JUST RECEIVED FROM ADENAUER. HE DESCRIBED IT AS ESSENTIALLY DEVOTED TO LENGTHY ARGUMENT AS TO WHY WESTERN POWERS SHOULD NOT CONCENTRATE ON REUNIFICATION.

SECRETARY NOTED THAT REASONING WAS QUITE FALLACIOUS. POINT EMPHASIZED THAT PARTITION OF GERMANY WAS NOT CAUSE BUT EFFECT OF PRESENT TENSIONS. IT WAS SCARCELY NECESSARY TO EMPHASIZE THIS TO WESTERN POWERS. HOWEVER CHANCELLOR DREW CONCLUSION THAT BECAUSE THEY ALLEGEDLY HELD THIS VIEW THEY WERE UNDER GREAT PRESSURE TO PAY TOO BIG PRICE FOR GERMAN REUNIFICATION WHICH THEORETICALLY WOULD SOLVE ALL WORLD PROBLEMS. LLOYD COMMENTED THAT. OUT OF LOYALTY TO ADENAUER, WESTERN POWERS HAD BEEN SAYING, THAT DIVISION OF GERMANY IS BASIC CAUSE OF TENSIONS. SECRETARY NOTED THAT ADENAUER TOOK POSITION THAT WE SHOULD ALMOST DROP GERMAN QUESTION AND CONCENTRATE ON DISARMAMENT. AFTER OUR TWO RECENT EXPERIENCES AT GENEVA WE DO NOT FEEL THAT THIS IS A PARTICULARLY FRUITFUL FIELD AT PRESENT TIME. ATTEMPT TO SHIFT ENTIRE ATTENTION TO DISARMAMENT FIELD WOULD BE FUTILE. WE COULD NOT GET AWAY FROM PROBLEM WHICH SOVIETS WERE POSING, MAKING GERMANY AND BERLIN FOCAL POINT.

LLOYD COMMENTED THAT THIS CONSONANT WITH WHAT SCHERPENBERG SAID. LATTER SAID RE REUNIFICATION THAT ALL THAT WAS NEEDED WAS A LITTLE LIGHT AT END OF LONG TUNNEL. HOWEVER ANY NEUTRALIZATION FORMULA WAS UNACCEPTABLE, AND MOST GERMANS SAW THIS.

DULLES

MLJ/23



42-M Action Classification Control: 2569

Rec'd: FEBRUARY 5, 1959

12:03 AM

EUR Info

FROM: LONDON

031

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

.ss NO:

SECTO 4, FEBRUARY 5, 2 AM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

W G

SP PRIORITY

C INR H

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 4, REPEATED INFORMATION MOSCOW 150, BONN 246. PARIS 621. BERLIN 79


LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

AFTER LLOYD HAD NOTED THAT SCHERPENBERG HAD INDICATED SOME UN INTEREST IN BERLIN MIGHT BE USEFUL SECRETARY SAID HE BELIEVED THAT ONCE TROOPS OF THREE WESTERN POWERS LEFT BERLIN GAME WOULD BE UP. AT LEAST PEOPLE OF WEST BERLIN FELT THAT WAY. HE MENTIONED THAT BRANDT WAS ARRIVING IN US NEXT WEEK, AND WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE EFFECT ON AMERICAN OPINION. SECRETARY SAID THAT TALK ABOUT UN INVOLVED RESORT TO VAGUE FORMULA. IT WAS NOT CORPORATE BODY WITH FORCES OF ITS OWN. IF AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED THAT UN WOULD DESIGNATE THREE WESTERN POWERS TO ACT FOR IT IN BERLIN, THAT WOULD BE SATIS-FACTORY, BUT SOVIETS COULD HARDLY ACCEPT. HE ADDED THAT ONE COULD CONCEIVABLY FIND UN TROOPS TO REPLACE WESTERN FORCES. THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ARRANGE. BERLINERS MIGHT HAVE SUFFICIENT CONFIDENCE IF THESE FORCES HAD ADEQUATE STRENGTH WITH CLEAR MANDATE, BUT EXPERIENCE PROVED UN FORCES TENDED TO DISINTEGRATE.

LLOYD SAID HE REGARDED UN ASPECT AS ESSENTIALLY MOVE IN GAME. HE COULD NOT SEE IT AS EFFECTIVE, BUT IDEA THAT WHOLE OF BERLIN MIGHT BE UNDER UN TUTELAGE WITH GUARANTEE OF ACCESS HAD APPEAL. SCVIETS PROBABLY COULD NOT ACCEPT. DURING DISCUSSION POSSIBILITY UN GUARANTEE, SECRETARY NOTED THAT UN AS SUCH COULD NOT GIVE GUARANTEE.


JEBB SECRETS STATES

JEBB WHO REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED. UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"



-2- SECTO 4, FEBRUARY 5, 2 AM, FROM LONDON (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

JEBB WHO ALSO PRESENT NOTED THAT UNDER ARTICLE 51
OF CHARTER MEMBERS WOULD BE IN POSITION TO TAKE SUCH ACTION
AS DEEMED DESIRABLE. SECRETARY REITERATED THAT HE DID NOT
SEE ANY REAL PRACTICAL SUBSTITUTE TO HAVING OUR TROOPS
IN BERLIN. MIKOYAN HAD EMPHASIZED THAT EAST BERLIN
BELONGED TO GDR AND COULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN ANY PLAN.
BEST TO HOPE FOR WAS THAT SOVIETS WOULD ALLOW THEIR BERLIN
PROPOSALS TO LAPSE.



SECRET



-3- SECTO 4. FEBRUARY 5, 2 AM, FROM LONDON (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

	-							-			_	_				_		_	_				_	_		-										
- 1									- 4					-	-	_			·												-	_		_	_	_
		-				•		• •	• •	•	• •	• •	•	• •		•	• •		•			• •	•		• •											
- 1		•																												- 1		_ :		1 1		
- 1.		_						•						- •	•										•	• •	• •	• •		• •	• •			•.•		•
		•	•		• •	• •						• •		• •		•																		•'•		
- 1.		•																_ :									• •			• •	• •	• •	• •			•
		•	•		• •		•	• •	,,,	•		• •	•	• •		•														• •						
- 1																												_ :	1 1	•			• •		••	•
- 11		-				•						٠,		• •	• •		• •	• •	• •											• •	• •					
- 41		•								•	• •																									
- 1.						٠					-					-			٠.	•	• •	• •	•	•	•	• •		•	• •	::						
		•								•																										
- 14										_					. :			1 1			٠.,		•		•	• •			• •	•	• •	• •	• •		• •	• (
		•	•	•	• •			••		•																										
																		- '-										-					• •	• •		•
		•	•			• •	• •	• •	• •	•	• •	٠.	•	• •	• •	•	•	٠,					• •	•	•		• •			• •						
- 10											• •																					_ :				
										-		•		•	•	•	•	• •	٠.	•	• •	• •	•			• •	• •	• •		• •	• •	• •				
- 14							• •																													
								. i	_ :	_ :			. I .	. :		-						• •	٠.				••	- •	• •	• •	•	• • •		• •	• •	
		• •		•			•		• •	•																				::						
14							- 4																				•		• •	• •	•	• • •		• •	• •	
		٠.		•	•		•	•	• •	• •	•			• •		•		• •		•	• •															
- [•	•																													1 1					,	
								-								•	•	• •		•	•	• •					• •									
- 1 -	•		, .	• (• •					• •																									1 1	
۱.	•															-	-					• •	• •	٠.	•			• •	• •		• • •			• •		• •
				•	•	• •		•	• •	• •				•	• •																					
٠.	•																	. :	. :								• •		• •	• • •	•		•	• •	• •	
				•				•	• •	•	•	• •	•		• •	• •		• •	• •	• •	•	• •		• •	• •	•	• •						• • •			
•	•							•																												• •
				_						- •		- •		-	- •			•	- •		•				• •		• •									
	•	•		• •					• •																											
۱.	•												1 7	_						- •			•						- •	- • •					• •	
		•						•		• •																				• • •						
1 .																				_ :								-		- • •						
		: *	-		- '			•					- •	•						• •		• •	• •	• •				• •								
	•							•	• •																											•
	•			_			_ :	. [. •	- '	- •			- •			•	- •	- •							(• •	• •	• • •	•				• •	
	•		•																			• •								• • •					1 1	· .
١.	•													_										•	•				• •				•	, .	• •	
				٠.	•	• •	• •	•	• •		•	• •		•			• •	•	• •									• •		• • •						
1.																						- -											•		• •	• •
- 10					-		•	-	•	• •	•		• •	•	• •	• •	• •	•	• •	• •	•	• •	• •			•	• • •	• •					• •			
	•		•			• •			• •					• •														• •								
١.																		•			•	• •	• •				• • •	•	•	• • •				•		
١.	•	• •	•				• •	•	• •		•	• •			• •			•	• •			• •														
	•																				_			-		-							•	•	• • •	• •
1.	-		-	•	•		•	•	• •	• •	• •	•																								
10									• •																	- :									• • •	• •
1.	_		_	_	- 1								• •	• •	-		• •	•	•	• •	• •		• •		• •	• •			•							
	•		•		•			• (• •	• •	•																							I I .	
- 1-			•																			•		• •	• •	•							• •		••	
1	•		•	• •	• •		• •	•		• •	•		• •		•	• •	• •					•														
le.			•																							٠.					• •	• •			, , ,	
1-	•		•	• •	•		• •	• •	•			•		•	•	• •	• •	•				• •														
10	•		•			•																														•
١.		_ :	_						-	- •	•	•		•	-	• •		• •	•	• •	• •	• •	• •	• •	• •	• 1										
	•		•			•	• •		• •													•														
I_			_					- 1	- 1	1 1						•		• •				•	• •	• •	• •	•										
			•			•	• •																													
			•																		- 1	_					• • •		•		• •	• •	• •			
١-	•	•	•	• •		•		• •	•	• •	• •	•	• •	• •		••							• •	• •	• •											
10																																		•		
1.			_			-	•				•	•				• •				• •			•	• •	• •						• •					
,,	• •		•																														_ :			_
1-	- 4		_												_	_						•	• •		• •		• • •				• •			• •		
1-		•	-	• •		•	• •		•	• •		•	• •	• •		• •						• •	• •													
			•												•															• •				•		•
1			-			-			•			•	• •	• •	•	••		• •	•	• •				• •		• •										
			•									•																	- 1							
1.			_			_			-			-						٠.		• •	• •	~• •	• • .	•	• •			• •			• •					
•		•	•	• •		•						•																						_		_
1.			•																							-					- •		• •			•
1		-	-	- •		-					- •	•							•	• •		• •	•	• •	• •											
(•	• •	•	•	• •		•	• •					•																	_						•	•
1-			_	• -		_			`							-			-				•									• •				•
	•	•	•	• •		•						•							•																	
		-	•			•						_											-								• •	• •	• •			•
1 -		-	-		• •	•		• •	•	•	• •	•	• •	• •	•		• •		•					• •												
		•	•	• •			• •					•																		• •			-		- •	•
١.	_ `	_	_			- 1			- •	_		-			- 1	_	- •		•				•				••			• •	• •	• •	• •			•
١.	• •	•	•	• •			• •			•																								_ :		
1 -						_						_							-															• •		•
i •	•	. •	•	• •	• •	•			•	• •		•	• •		• •	•		•	•	• •										• •						
1 .		•																				_		_ :	_ :				•	• • •		- •		- •		•
ı.			- '		. •	- '				-		-					- •		•			• •			• •					• •		• •				
		•		• •			•																											. •		-
J .		_	_			_ :						-	-			-	•	- •	-				•	• •			• •			•		• •	• •			•
	• •	•	•			• •	•		• •						• •																					_
١.			_									_							- '		-		- '						••							•
	• •	•	•		- •	• •	•	• •		•	• •	•			• •		• •	• •	•											::						
																			_				. = '												• •	•
ı - '	•	-	- '			- •	•				- •	- 1	•	- •		•		• •	• (•					• •											
		•		•																									. :	• •						- '
١.			_ :	. :		- •				-				- •		•			• •	•			•	•	• •		• •	• •		• •	• •	• •	• •			
		•	• (• •	•	•						• •																							
٠.												_							- '			- •	- '										- +			•
• •	•	•	• •	•			•		• •																											
		•		•																					_ :	-			. •				- •	•	•	•
ı -	•	-	•		- •		•			•				- •	- •	•		• •	• •	•			• •	•	• •		• •	• •		::		• •	• •			
•		•		• •			•			•				• •		•														•						- '
۱.		_								-		- 1	: :			-		•	- '	•					•			- •		• •	• •		• •		• •	
		•	•						• •	•		• •		• •		•	• •																			
le d												_				_						- •														•
ι- ՝		-	- •	•						-			•		• •	•	• •	• •	• •	•			•		• •					• •	• •					
																_						_			-					•	-		- •	•		
}• ·		•																																		

SECRETARY SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SEE PURPOSE BEHIND SOVIET MOVES. THEY WISHED MINIMIZE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF FREE BERLIN. HE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED ON VISIT LAST MAY WITH DYNAMIC NATURE WEST SECTORS. THIS WAS CONTRAST WITH UNPOPULAR REGIME IN EAST GERMANY. DISCUSSION BERLIN ENDED WITH REMARK BY HOYER MILLAR WHO ALSO PRESENT THAT ONE CONCESSION WEST MIGHT MAKE WOULD BE TO CUT DOWN PROPAGANDA AND RELATED ACTIVITIES IN WEST BERLIN.

DULLES

JBB

